The UK government is testing out a fresh approach on leaving the EU, but this isn't equivalent to a policy reversal. The adjustment is mostly in tone.
In the past, the Labour leadership portrayed Britain's separation from Europe as a permanent feature of the national situation, awkward to handle perhaps, but inescapable. Now, they are prepared to admit it as a serious problem.
Addressing attendees at a local economic summit recently, the chancellor listed EU withdrawal together with the pandemic and spending cuts as factors behind ongoing financial stagnation. She reiterated this viewpoint during an IMF gathering in Washington, observing that the national efficiency issue has been compounded by the way in which the Britain departed from the European Union.
This represented a precisely formulated declaration, attributing harm not to the departure decision but to its execution; blaming the officials who handled it, not the voters who endorsed it. This distinction will be crucial when the financial plan is unveiled soon. The goal is to attribute some fiscal difficulties to the deal negotiated by Boris Johnson without appearing to dismiss the aspirations of those who voted to exit.
Among evidence-focused observers, the financial debate is largely settled. An independent fiscal watchdog estimates that Britain's long-term productivity is 4% lower than it would have been with ongoing European partnership.
In addition to the costs of trade friction, there has been a sustained decline in business investment caused by governmental uncertainty and unclear rules. There was also the opportunity cost of government energy being diverted toward a task for which no preparation had been made, since supporters had seriously considered the practical implications of achieving it.
When facts are undeniable, officials find it hard to maintain political neutrality. The Bank of England governor told a recent international forum that he holds no position on Brexit before adding that its impact on growth will be negative for the foreseeable future.
He forecast a mild corrective rebalancing eventually, which provides scant relief to a treasury head who must address a major funding gap immediately. Taxes are set to rise, and the chancellor wants the citizens to understand that Brexit is a partial cause.
The statement is worth making because it is true. That doesn't guarantee electoral advantage from expressing it. This truth was evident when the government delivered its earlier fiscal plan and during the national vote, which the party fought while sidestepping the inevitability of tax increases.
At this stage, with the administration being established but unpopular, detailing financial struggles sounds like justifying failure to many voters. There could be more advantage in faulting the Tories for all problems if they were the only alternative and a serious challenger. The usual ruling party tactic in a two-party system is to assert responsibility for fixing the previous administration's mess and caution voters. The rise of another party complicates matters.
Ideological gaps between the two parties are minimal, but the electorate observe interpersonal conflict more than ideological alignment. Those attracted to Nigel Farage due to distrust in establishment—especially on immigration control—do not view the two parties as aligned groups. The Conservatives has a history of allowing immigration, while Reform does not—a difference Farage will consistently highlight.
Farage is less eager to talk about EU exit, in part since it is a achievement jointly owned with Tories and also because there are no positive outcomes to showcase. When pressed, he may argue that the vision was undermined by poor execution, but even that defense admits failure. Easier to redirect conversation.
This explains why the government feels more confident raising the issue. Starmer's recent party conference speech marked a turning point. Earlier, he had discussed UK-EU relations in bureaucratic language, focusing on a relationship reset that targeted uncontentious obstacles like customs checks while steering clear of the divisive cultural issues at the core of the post-referendum turmoil.
In his speech, the PM did not fully embrace pro-EU arguments, but he suggested familiarity with previous assertions. He mentioned "false promises on the side of the campaign vehicle"—referring to leave campaign pledges about NHS funding—in the context of "snake oil" promoted by politicians whose easy fixes worsen the nation's problems.
Leaving Europe was compared to the pandemic as difficult experiences endured by ordinary people in recent years. Comparing Brexit to a disease signals a tougher tone, even if the financial steps currently under discussion in EU headquarters remain unchanged.
The aim is to link the Reform leader to a notorious case of political mis-selling, implying he cannot be trusted; that he capitalizes on frustration and creates conflict but lacks governing competence.
Recent suspensions of local representatives from the party's administrative wing reinforces that message. Recorded videos of a online meeting revealed internal squabbling and recrimination, highlighting the challenges inexperienced figures face when providing community resources on tight finances—much harder than distributing leaflets about cutting waste or controlling immigration.
This criticism is effective for the government, but it requires the government's service delivery being sufficiently strong that choosing the challengers seems a dangerous experiment. Additionally, this is a strategy for a future campaign that may not occur until the end of the decade. If Starmer and Reeves wish to appear as antidotes to Faragism, they must demonstrate in the interim with a positively defined agenda of their own.
Restrictions exist to what is possible with a change in tone, and time is short. It would be simpler to make the case today that Brexit is an affliction and Farage a fraud if they had said so earlier. What additional choices might they have? Do they merit praise for admitting it now when other excuses have failed? Yes. But the problem of arriving at the evident truth via the longest path is that observers wonder the procrastination. Starting from the truth is faster.